Consciousness, Free Will and Roger Penrose

[Note:  since I first wrote this entry, I've worked on developing a new theory of consciousness and free will that starts here.]

          I just finished reading a book called “Shadows of the Mind” by Roger Penrose.  It was written in 1994, and I see he has some more recent books out now, so I might check those out.  This book had some pretty interesting sections to it and brought together a few of the thoughts I have expressed in some of my previous entries.  Therefore, I thought it would be worth discussing the ideas in this book a bit.

          First of all, I have to admit that this book was the most technically-challenging book I can ever remember reading (excluding, I suppose, various textbooks from my college courses, but I don’t remember those anymore!).  I wouldn’t say the math is extremely advanced, but I found it very very difficult to follow.  On the back of the book there is a quote from the Los Angeles Times: “Elegant…beautifully written and argued.”  I seriously doubt that the average reader would understand the middle 80% of the book.  I mean, I’m not a mathematician or physicist, but I do have a PhD in engineering so I figure I’m at least an average reader with respect to a mathematical and scientific background, and I found this to be extremely difficult to follow.

          Despite the difficulty, there are some very interesting ideas put forward.  But what I’m mostly interested in is how this book perfectly illustrates a point I often try to make about our preconceived notions.  The theme of the first half of the book has to do with whether computers (or “Turing Machines”) will ever be able to achieve human consciousness.  Ultimately, Penrose shows that humans can understand certain things about mathematics that can be “proven” to be non-computational.  Since computers can only operate on computations, then they can never achieve the same level of understanding.  I’m not sure that our non-computational understanding of mathematics is the same as consciousness (!), but the point he is trying to make is that computers will never be able to duplicate what humans can do in this particular instance.

          Penrose proposes four viewpoints regarding this issue that I would like to copy here because I think they are worth considering:

“A.  All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations.

B.  Awareness is a feature of the brain’s physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness.

C.  Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but the physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.

D.  Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientific terms.”

          Penrose fully supports Option C, and the rest of the book is about defending that option.  His point is that A and B cannot be true (based on the proofs he goes through, among other things) and therefore a “new science” is needed.  The subtitle of the book is “A search for the missing science of consciousness”.  He shows that there is nothing in science that can possibly achieve some of the key aspects of consciousness, therefore we will need some new approach.  Ultimately, he suggests that this new science might be found somewhere in the mysterious connection between the quantum world and the Newtonian world and suggests this might occur in the cytoskeletons of neurons.  But this is only a vague perception of where this new science of consciousness might begin to be found.  It’s not a real suggestion of a solution – it’s just a possible direction to start looking.

          Although I fully support Option D, I do appreciate Penrose’s approach to trying to figure out a scientific answer to this issue.  What Penrose does show is that there is a fundamental difficulty in answering the problem of consciousness using current scientific understanding, but he fully expects that there will, ultimately, be a scientific explanation.

          I argued for Option D <*here*> - that was before I read Penrose’s book.  I was focusing on free will, but the issues related to consciousness are the same in this case [1].  I argued that, since science had no explanation for free will, and no clear hope of ever being able to explain free will, the logical conclusion was that there was a non-material (i.e. supernatural) explanation for free will.  What Penrose clearly illustrates is what I have pointed out elsewhere:  no amount of evidence will ever be sufficient to cause a committed materialist to allow a supernatural element into his/her thinking.  Penrose admits that Option D is a possible option in this case.  He shows that Options A and B cannot be true.  But when it comes to Option D, all he can say is “give me a chance to show you that Option C is a reasonable option.”  This is because he can’t rule out Option D – all he can do is just eliminate it on the basis of his a priori biases against any supernatural explanation for anything.  This is what I have referred to as “locking and bolting the door” with respect to belief in anything supernatural. 

          I am not at all proposing that it is wrong to diligently seek for a scientific explanation for consciousness and free will.  In fact, I’d like to explore that area in my own research (if I had the time…which doesn’t seem likely these days).  I like Penrose’s approach and his search for ideas and I, personally, think he has some pretty interesting proposals.  All I want is for the materialist to be honest.  The materialist rejects God a priori, not because of any logical argument.  And, not only that, but the materialist locks and bolts the door against any possible intrusion of anything “supernatural.”  As a result, the one thing that the materialist cannot say is “if God wanted me to believe in Him, all He would have to do is appear before me.”   As I have argued before, that is simply not true.  If you really want an honest experience with God, you will first have to unlock your committed materialism and allow for the supernatural (i.e. miracles) to at least some degree.

          There are a small minority of committed materialists – those who are called the “new atheists” – who shake their fists at God and say “if I don’t believe, it’s Your fault.”  Some of these individuals have become famous and their views make the popular media.  I don’t believe they represent the vast majority of scientists and academics.  But these extremists do make it seem as if they are giving God a chance when, in reality, they have locked Him out.  If, instead, they were honest and said “there is no God and there is no amount of evidence of any sort that will change that fact”, then I could accept their position as being logically consistent.  I must admit that I have come to believe the opposite:  “there is a God (Jesus) and no amount of evidence of any sort will change that fact.”  I have come to that conclusion based on my own experiences, some of which have convinced me of the reality of Jesus.  But I didn’t start out that way – I didn’t start out with the conviction that Jesus was real.  However, as far back as I can remember, I always did allow for the possibility of the supernatural.  I always left the door open. 

          As far as I can tell, the consciousness that Roger Penrose imagines seems fundamentally random and void of a real will.  He proposes a new science will be necessary to even create a theory of consciousness.  Yet that still leaves us far short of achieving anything resembling a will - especially a free will, responsible for its own actions.  What will that require???

[1] Actually, since writing that sentence, I've changed my mind about this statement.  I now believe that free is such a unique and different problem when compared to the problem of consciousness that the two should not be lumped together.  See here to get a sense of that line of thinking.